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The Polish Banking System: A Case for Bank Consolidation and Foreign
Participation
Abstract
As Poland sits on the brink of European Union membership, it must quickly evolve its banking system into
one that is consistent with that of the European community. In order to achieve this objective, Poland’s
banks must put aside their Soviet past and begin offering reasonably priced products and services
comparable to those offered by their European counterparts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
banks because it is difficult to effectively process
ince 1989, a major crisis has existed
and use information. Technological advancement
in the banking systems of Eastern Euhas also been a serious problem in Poland. Poland
rope and the former Soviet Union. For
ranks thirty-ninth in technological advancement in
even the most developed of these countries, banking
the world, placing it far behind current EU members
inefficiency continues to be a serious setback in ecoand some of its Eastern European neighbors (Ranknomic transition. As Poland sits on the brink of Euroing, 2003). This disadvantage is also reflected in
pean Union membership, it must quickly evolve its
the high information costs found in the Polish bankbanking system into one that is consistent with that of
ing system. If Polish banks wish to succeed in the
the European community. In order to achieve this
global banking market, they must have the technolobjective, Poland’s banks must put aside their Soviet
ogy to process a large volume of transactions quickly
past and begin offering reasonably priced products
and cheaply.
and services comparable to those offered by their
Being able to provide inexpensive products
European counterparts.
is not enough to guarantee the success of Polish
Information and transacbanks; they must also be able
tion costs remain high in Poland
to deliver the products and serdue to remnants of the Soviet sysvices demanded by customers.
“As Poland sits on the
tem and a lack of up-to-date
Following the collapse of the
brink
of
European
Union
technology. Under the Soviet
Soviet banking system in Pomembership, it must
system, banks acted as a transland, banks essentially existed
mission belt of the state receiving
as regional monopolies, bequickly evolve its banking
money from the government and
cause new startup banks were
system. . .”
passing it on to borrowers based
undercapitalized and foreign
on governmental directives
banks were restricted by regu(Dittus, 1994). Accounting and financial systems durlation (Slay, 1996). With a regional monopoly, there
ing this era were poorly developed, and as a result, it
was no incentive for banks to innovate, because they
has been difficult for banks to accurately gather inforalready held the vast majority of the market share.
mation about their borrowers since the transition (Baer,
Polish banks will soon have to face competition and
1995). In addition, there is a scarcity of highly trained
their lack of innovation in the past will put them at a
bank employees who have knowledge of market analylarge disadvantage. When Poland enters the Eurosis and loan appraisal in Poland since these positions
pean Union, it will be forced to allow foreign banks
were not necessary prior to transition (Baer, 1995).
to operate in its country, and domestic banks will be
These problems result in high information costs for
forced to compete with these banks for customers
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(Jones, 1994). Polish banks will have to offer new
attention could be paid to developing new products
products and services in order to remain competitive,
and services.
so steps must be taken now in order to ensure that
Bonin, Mizsei, Szekely, and Wachtel (1998)
Polish banks are ready for this transition.
argue that foreign participation in the domestic marThis paper argues that the best solution to
ket will lead to product and service innovation, indealing with the high costs and poor range of prodcreased exploitation of economies of scale and
ucts and services that plagues
scope, and an environment of
the Polish banking system is to
competition. The authors claim
promote bank consolidation and
that because domestic banks
“Many critics of foreign
foreign bank participation. Secare often preoccupied with
competition
argue
that
it
tion II of this paper will review
technology problems, a lack of
previous research on bank conpersonnel, and undiversified
would drive many of the
solidation and foreign bank parloan portfolios, there tends to
small domestic banks out
ticipation as solutions to Poland’s
be little innovation in the bankof business in Poland.”
banking problems. In Section
ing systems of transition econoIII, I develop a formal argument
mies. Foreign banks have the
for bank consolidation based on
experience and technology to
the principles of economies of scale and an argument
develop new products and services and can more
for foreign participation based on oligopoly decisioneasily bring them to the Polish market. If foreign
making through game theory analysis and the learning
banks are allowed to enter, domestic banks will learn
curve. In Section IV, I illustrate the success of these
from their foreign competitors and copy new prodpractices by examining the advancements made by
ucts and services making the overall market better
Bank Handlowy following consolidation and partial
off. In addition, the authors claim that foreign banks
foreign ownership. Section V concludes with sugwill bring in new products and technologies that will
gestions on how to implement these policies.
allow domestic banks to better exploit economies
of scale and scope. They argue that foreign banks
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
can introduce some financial services such as insurBonin and Leven (1996) argue that in the unance, portfolio management, and brokerage actividerdeveloped Polish banking system, bank consolities to the market that would be difficult for domesdation would be cost effective and lead to better sertic banks to introduce on their own since they have
vices. They claim that economies of scale exist that
no experience. Polish banks could then learn more
would allow consolidated banks to have lower unit
about these products and begin offering their own
costs. This would occur because fixed costs could
versions, while exploiting the economies of scale and
be divided among a wider range of services leading
scope associated with these activities. The authors
to lower unit costs for expensive items such as new
also believe that new banking technologies, includcomputer systems. In addition, banks would be able
ing new payments systems, would increase the imto provide better services at lower costs to their cliportance of operating along economies of scale and
ents if banks were consolidated. This would occur
further push for small bank consolidation through
because the time needed to process transactions
merger and acquisition. Finally, they claim that dowould decrease along with transaction costs because
mestic banks have little experience with competitive
more transactions would involve intrabank transfers.
pressure and foreign banks could offer competition
Polish banks would also be better equipped to serve
that would lead to a more rapid innovation of banklarge clients because consolidation would create a large
ing services.
capital base and more deposits. The authors further
Buch (1997) argues that the positive effects
point out that with more revenue and resources, more
of international bank participation outweigh the pos40
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sible negative effects associated with it. Many critics of foreign competition argue that it would drive
many of the small domestic banks out of business in
Poland. Buch claims that this is not the case because, although foreign banks can often operate more
cheaply than domestic banks, domestic banks still
have advantages in some areas. Local banks are at
a comparative advantage to foreign banks for certain types of business because they have personal
contacts with customers, a pre-established customer
base, and a level of familiarity with the local market
and local tastes. Buch further argues that foreign
banks can contribute to a transfer of knowledge into
the banking system that will improve domestic bank
efficiency. Finally, the author claims that foreign
banks are needed to service the multinational corporations that exist in Poland, because these companies often require services that domestic banks
are not prepared to offer.
Overall, the previous research on this topic
strongly supports bank consolidation in Poland, as
well as the entrance of foreign banks into the local
market. The aforementioned authors agree that this
would increase the efficiency of domestic banks and
allow them to be more competitive with their European counterparts. The models that I develop next
further demonstrate the benefits of these processes
and reinforce the arguments presented by the previous authors.
III. FORMAL ARGUMENTS
I first present an argument for bank consolidation based on the principle of economies of
scale. Economies of scale exist when a firm can
double its output with less than twice as many inputs
(Pindyck, 2001). This occurs as long as the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output is
less than the average total cost of producing that
same level of output. Economies of scale are therefore characterized by the downward sloping section of the U-shaped long-run average total cost
curve. The lowest level of average total cost occurs
where the long-run average total cost curve intersects with the long-run marginal cost curve (Pindyck,
2001). This is the point where economies of scale

are exhausted since the average cost at this level of
output is equal to its marginal cost and as a result
there are no further benefits to increasing output.
Since, in the long-run, firms can vary all of their inputs including company size, it seems obvious that
companies that exist in an industry with economies of
scale should wish to grow in size. These companies
should continue to follow a growth strategy until
economies of scale are exhausted, and they can no
longer gain through increased production.
Hubbard (2002) claims that the goal of financial intermediaries is to exploit economies of scale
in the financial market by reducing the cost of providing services as the size of the funds they raise increases. Economies of scale in the banking system
exist from a variety of sources. Gramley (1969) suggests that economies of scale in banking are partially
driven by specialization of labor. He claims that the
tasks performed by bank employees require intense
knowledge of specific information, and these tasks
cannot be properly carried out without specialization. He also argues that the large variety of activities
offered by most commercial banks require proficiency in many different areas which best lend themselves to large scale operations where departmentalization can occur. Forestieri (1993) suggests two
other potential areas of economies of scale in banking: technology and information. Computer and information technologies are areas that can lead to
greater efficiency as the firm’s size increases because
the cost of new technologies are often largely fixed
and can be divided among a huge number of transactions. Increased size can also lower the cost of
gathering information since procedures and technologies can generally accommodate many additional
transactions without large increases in cost.
Forestieri identifies over a dozen scholarly
studies, which indicate that decreasing per unit costs
and a downward sloping section of the U-shaped
long-run average total cost curve exist in the banking
industry. This is a good indicator that Poland’s small
banks could significantly benefit from a growth strategy. An increase in the size of Polish banks should
decrease their transaction and information costs by
lowering the average costs of each additional unit.
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As a result, the new larger banks would be able to
accept domestic deposits but can make loans in the
offer banking services at prices closer to those of their
domestic market. If agency offices were allowed in
foreign competitors. Polish banks should keep inPoland, they would not bring about too much change
creasing in size until they are no longer able exploit
in the banking industry because their business is limadditional economies of scale by doing so. This will
ited to loans. In addition, agency offices are not
be the point where the short-run average total cost
widely used in international banking, so they are not
curve of the firm intersects its short-run marginal cost
the best option for change in Poland. Foreign subcurve as well as its long-run average cost curve and
sidiary banks function according to the rules of the
its long-run marginal cost curve.
country where they operate but are owned by a forIt seems obvious that,
eign firm and usually occur when
based on economies of scale,
a foreign company buys out a
banks should attempt to increase
domestic bank. The advantages
“Banks could begin a
in size to exploit the gains that
of foreign participation highexist in the industry, but how
lighted by Bonin and his colgrowth strategy relying on
should banks go about this proleagues in, as well as by Buch,
retained earnings and
cess? Banks could simply begin
could largely be achieved if forcontributed capital. . .”
a growth strategy relying on reeign banks were allowed to
tained earnings and contributed
freely acquire Polish banks.
capital to grow over time. This
Foreign banks have more exis a very slow process though and would not elimiperience and would introduce new banking pracnate banking problems in the near future. Banks could
tices and technologies to the domestic banks, which
also be consolidated based on governmental decithese banks could then acquire. Finally, foreign
sion-making. This may be a quick way to perform
banks could establish foreign branch banks, which
the process, but it ignores market forces and could
have the ability to accept deposits and make loans
potentially lead to corruption and rent-seeking, neibut are generally started from scratch by a foreign
ther of which are economically efficient practices. The
bank rather than through a buy out (Hubbard, 2002).
best strategy would be to allow banks to consolidate
These banks usually bear the name of their foreign
naturally through merger and acquisition. This would
owner and could offer advantages to the Polish
allow market forces to decide which banks were vibanking market through competition. Foreign subable in the long-run. This may not be as quickly implesidiaries and foreign branch banks both seem to ofmented as government driven consolidation, but acfer potential advantages for the Polish banking syscording to Bonin, Mizsei, Szekely, and Wachtel, this
tem. To more clearly illustrate these advantages, I
could be done relatively quickly and effectively if legmake an argument for foreign subsidiaries based on
islation were designed in a way to promote merger
the learning curve and foreign branch banks based
and acquisition activity. Poland must support some
on oligopoly decision-making through game theory
method of bank consolidation if it wants its banks to
analysis.
be financially-sound in the future. Allowing for mergIf foreign banks purchase banks in Poland,
ers and acquisitions is likely to be the most successful
they will wish to install the technology and banking
method.
methods that they have successfully used elsewhere.
Secondly, I argue that foreign banks should
These technologies and practices would obviously
be allowed to participate in the Polish market. Accarry with them large economies of scale, which
cording to Hubbard (2002), there are three distinct
would reduce costs as previously discussed, but
ways that foreign banks can participate in a domestic
would also carry with them a learning curve. As
market: as agency offices, as foreign branch banks,
these banks implemented the new innovations
and as foreign subsidiaries. Agency offices cannot
brought to them from abroad, they would progres42
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sively become more efficient at carrying out the new
practices and using the new technologies. This would
occur because workers take more time to do tasks
as they are learning them and gradually become more
efficient as their training progresses (Pindyck, 2001).
Ultimately, the period of time needed to complete
tasks decreases and, with it, the average total cost
of completing each task or transaction. As a result,
the average total cost curve will shift downward for
all levels of production (Pindyck, 2001). As the
average total cost curve shifts, the cost of producing every unit of output decreases. The average
total cost curve will continue to shift downward until
the new practice is fully implemented and employees have found the most effective and time efficient
way of carrying out the new practice. The learning
curve process therefore involves downward shifts
in the average total cost curve, as opposed to the
movement along the average total cost curve associated with decreased costs due to economies of
scale. Because of these downward shifts, foreign
subsidiaries will allow banks to exploit the learning
curving, as well as economies of scale, ultimately
leading to cheaper financial services for Polish customers that are more competitive with international
standards.
The banking system is essentially an oligopoly
market in most countries, because only a limited
number of banks exist due to economies of scale
and banking regulation, both of which create barriers to entry in the market. Because there are only a
limited number of banks and their products, though
differentiated, are often substitutable, banks must
consider the actions of their competitors when making decisions. In Poland, the regional monopolies
mean little competition exists in the banking market.
If foreign banks were allowed to enter the Polish
market and create branch banks, the resulting competition would improve Polish banks and benefit the
banking system, as a whole, because the decisions
of the branch banks would influence the decisionmaking of domestic banks.
To see how foreign bank competition will
force Polish domestic banks to innovate and modernize, one can examine a few simple examples of

oligopoly decision-making based on game theory
analysis. For instance, if a domestic bank and foreign bank are both considering offering a new product to their customers in the southern region of Poland, both firms must consider the decision of their
competitor. The payoff matrix below, Figure 1, shows
the annual profits achieved by each firm given the
other firm’s decisions:
FIGURE 1
Payoff Matrix

In this case, if the foreign bank creates a new
product, it is in the Polish bank’s best interest to follow suit; however, if the foreign bank does not produce a new product, it is in the Polish bank’s best
interest to also not produce a new product. In this
case, the foreign bank has a dominant strategy, a
strategy that it should follow regardless of its
competitor’s actions (Pindyck, 2001). It would be
in the best interest of the foreign bank to produce the
new product regardless of the Polish bank’s decision. The Polish bank, on the other hand, has no
dominant strategy and therefore must consider what
decision its competitor will make. Because it is in the
foreign bank’s best interest to produce the new product, it will do so. The Polish bank should also produce the new product because it will earn a higher
profit by producing it than by not producing it. As a
result of this competition, the market gets a new product that otherwise would not have been present had
the Polish bank remained the regional monopoly.
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Even if neither bank has a dominant strategy,
as previously described, foreign competition can still
create a positive situation in the Polish banking system. For instance, if there are two new products being introduced into the financial market, but there is
enough demand in the market for a product if only
one bank produces it, then the situation illustrated
below in Figure 2 will occur:
FIGURE 2
Payoff Matrix

In this situation, one bank must make a decision first because the risk of both banks introducing
products at the same time and both introducing the
same product is too high. The foreign bank would
likely proceed first in this situation because it has more
experience with product placement. The domestic
bank would then attempt to do its best given what the
foreign bank had chosen, in essence, searching for its
Nash equilibrium (Pindyck, 2001). If the foreign bank
was to choose Product B, then the Polish bank should
naturally choose Product A because this choice maximizes its profits given the constraints imposed by its
competitor. Once again, the Polish bank would be
encouraged to be competitive and introduce new
product lines or technologies because of foreign bank
entry. It is impossible to guess what sort of payoff
matrices will face Polish banks following the complete introduction of foreign banks, but it seems that
these banks will help to bring about competition and
44

innovation.
It appears that both foreign bank participation and bank consolidation will lead to advantages
in the Polish banking system. For the optimum results, however, these methods must be used in conjunction. Bank consolidation, practiced alone, could
create a situation in which Polish banks gain a large
degree of monopoly power since the number of
banks in the system would be reduced significantly.
This could potentially lead to higher prices and fewer
services in the industry. However, Bonin and Levin
argue that if foreign banks are allowed to participate fully in the Polish market, this situation can be
avoided and the banking sector could flourish. In
addition, bank consolidation would allow Polish
banks to withstand the competitive pressure brought
on by foreign competition without closing even though
foreign banks will bring with them more capital and
resources. This combination of consolidation and
foreign participation, over time, should bring Polish
banks up to the standards of their Western European counterparts.
IV. EVIDENCE AND RESULTS: A CASE
STUDY
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of
bank consolidation and foreign participation, I
present the case of one bank in Poland that has undergone these procedures. During Soviet times,
Bank Handlowy was a large state-owned bank that
serviced primarily foreign trade firms and governmental transactions, but since that time has both
merged and been purchased by a foreign bank
(Murdoch, 1999). In June of 2000, New York based
Citigroup, Inc. completed acquisition on the bank
with the purchase of 66% of Bank Handlowy’s
shares (Citigroup, 2000). The bank also completed
a series of mergers and acquisition with smaller domestic banks, increasing the bank’s size and customer base. Today, the bank is officially known as
Bank Przemysowo-Handlowy (Report, 2003). The
bank has realized two important advantages to its
new arrangement: the ability to offer new products
and services and lower costs. New products and
services are directly correlated to the increasingly
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competitive nature of the financial market and the
leadership of foreign owner Citigroup. Bank
Handlowy has been able to develop customized
banking services for retail clients and small businesses, expand electronic banking services, and increase brokerage and asset management operations
(Report, 2003). The bank has also been able to
increase its standing in the commercial banking arena
by creating industry-specific departments for its largest clients (Report, 2003). These departments allow the bank to offer more specialized products and
services to big-ticket clients. In addition, Bank
Handlowy has been able to successfully increase its
market share and increase profits by offering these
new options. These products and services clearly
show innovation in the Polish market brought about
by the participation of Citigroup.
Bank Handlowy has also been able to exploit the economies of scale associated with its new
larger size. Between 2001 and 2002, Bank
Handlowy dropped its cost-to-income ratio from
63.6% to 63.4% despite the severe financial hardships the Polish economy suffered during that period (Report, 2003). A new information technology
system has allowed the company to exploit economies of scale and the learning curve as well while
creating a system that now serves 2.7 million customers at more than 500 locations (Report, 2003).
Cost saving measures such as this will ultimately give
Bank Handlowy an advantage in the marketplace
by allowing it to offer more products at lower prices.
Bank consolidation and foreign participation have clearly helped Bank Handlowy achieve its
goals and increase its position in the market. Other
banks could certainly benefit in similar ways from
these methods. If banks are allowed to follow natural
market forces and merge and interact with foreign
banks, they should move towards the success
achieved by Bank Handlowy and could finally become competitive on the international scene.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
The goal of this paper has been to illustrate
how the inefficiencies of the Polish banking system

can be tackled through bank consolidation and foreign participation; however, in order for such policies to be successful, they must be widely accepted
and implemented by the Polish government and
people. Thus far, foreign participation has met only
limited acceptance in Poland. Very few foreign branch
banks have been allowed to exist in the country (Polish, 2002). Jones (1994) claims that the Polish National Bank is reluctant to allow foreign branch banks
to operate because legislators would prefer foreign
banks to become strategic partners with faltering
domestic banks or even to purchase failing domestic
banks making them subsidiaries. This can be clearly
seen in the differing treatment the government gives
to foreign branch banks and foreign subsidiaries.
Foreign bank subsidiaries are allowed to carry out
many types of business activities including such things
as insurance and investment banking while foreign
branch banks are restricted from these areas (Polish,
2002). This clearly gives foreign subsidiaries a large
advantage over branch banks. A general fear of foreign banks still exists among the populace. Many
believe that foreign banks will take over Poland’s
banking industry entirely, and the public outcry created by such fears has lead to protectionist policies
(Fear, 1998). These issues must be conquered if
Poland wants its banking system to be competitive in
the future. To be successful, the government needs
to gradually start allowing foreign banks to establish
themselves in Poland, which should lead to increased
competition without overwhelming the market.
It is widely accepted that Polish banks are
currently too small to handle global competition, and
the government has taken some steps to push banks
towards consolidation (Jones, 1994). The Polish
government has created legislation that establishes
minimum capital requirements for all banks. Banks
will be required to hold 500,000 zloty by the end of
2005 and 1 million zloty by the end of 2010 (Polish
Banking System, 2002). These measures should help
to eliminate poorly capitalized banks and will hopefully reduce the number of banks as well. To ensure
further and more rapid consolidation, the government
could attempt to implement merger-friendly policies
including tax breaks, which would further help the
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consolidation process (Bonin,1998).
The research and theories that I have presented seem to offer a solid theoretical argument for
the success of the Polish banking industry under the
policies that I have suggested. Economies of scale
and the learning curve effect should lower transaction
and information costs if banks are allowed to consolidate and foreign banks are allowed to purchase
subsidiaries. In addition, foreign participation should
lead to competitive actions among banks in the industry and new products and technologies. It is now
up to the Polish government to take additional action
to ensure that these practices are fully and effectively
carried out.
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